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Election Note: The September 20, 2015 Parliamentary Elections in Greece  
1. Background 
The early parliamentary election of September 20, 2015 was called only eight months after the 
previous one was held (January 25, 2015) as the SYRIZA-Independent Greeks coalition government 
resigned in late August and the negotiations that followed among party leaders did not result in the 
formation of a new government. The resignation was triggered by the fact that the government lost its 
majority in the parliament, after the leftist faction of SYRIZA abandoned the party to form its own 
parliamentary group known as Popular Unity. 
First, we briefly summarize the events that took place between the two parliamentary elections of 
2015 (January 25 and September 20). In the January election, SYRIZA, a party of the radical left, won 
the election and elected 149 out of 300 parliament members. SYRIZA formed a post-electoral coalition 
with Independent Greeks, a right-wing populist party, on the basis of their anti-austerity platforms. 
Together they commanded more than the required absolute majority of seats in the parliament (see 
Table 1). Independent Greeks received a small number of ministerial portfolios (e.g. its leader became 
the Minister of Defence) and offered continuous support to the decisions of Prime Minister Alexis 
Tsipras regarding the most important issue during this period: the negotiations between the Greek 
authorities and its institutional lenders (European Central Bank, European Commission, International 
Monetary Fund). 
During the January campaign both SYRIZA and Independent Greeks promised that, if elected, they 
will annul the previous set of agreements with Greece's institutional lenders (known in Greek politics 
as “memorandum”). Instead, they will negotiate from scratch a new agreement with Greece’s lenders. 
This new agreement will have very different characteristics compared to the previous agreements, 
including that a) international institutions’ representatives will no longer be supervising the 
implementation of the agreement in Greece, and b) the largest part of the Greek debt will be forgiven. 
Yet, in the months that followed, Greece's institutional lenders were not willing to alter the main 
characteristics of the agreement, while the coalition government was not willing to step back from its 
pre-electoral promises. This led, in the beginning of the summer, to a deadlock between Greece and its 
institutional lenders which culminated in the end of June, when Greece missed its loan repayment to 
the IMF1 and Greece’s creditors refused to extend the second Greek bailout programme.2 In response, 
                                                          
1  Technically speaking, the IMF declared Greece to be in arrears in order to avoid using the term default. 
 
2  The programme was left to expire without the final evaluation being concluded successfully and, as a 
result, the final tranche was never disbursed. At the same time, a new round of negotiations between Greece and 
its institutional lenders concerning a third two-year bailout programme had started.  
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the Prime Minister called a referendum on the topic of whether or not to accept the terms of 
agreement for a new bailout programme, which were presented to the Greek government by its 
institutional lenders during the Eurogroup meeting of June 25, 2015 –himself endorsing a “No” vote. 
The announcement of the referendum led to an immediate imposition of capital controls –some of 
them still apply (e.g. in January 2016 there was still a weekly 420 euros limit on all cash 
withdrawals). This, in turn, intensified the recession dynamics (European Commission 2015a, 2015b) 
that followed Greece's half-a-year long denial to accept its lenders’ terms.3 The outcome of the 
referendum was against Greece accepting the terms of its institutional lenders.4 A week later, at an EU 
Summit of Heads of States, where the future of Greece in the Eurozone was at stake, the Greek Prime 
Minister agreed to the terms, proposed by Greece’s institutional lenders, for a third bailout 
programme. 
In the weeks that followed the capitulation of the Greek Prime Minister, many SYRIZA MPs resigned 
from the party but kept their seats in parliament. This resulted in the SYRIZA led coalition government 
losing its parliamentary majority. Despite the coalition losing its majority, the agreement that was 
concluded between the Greek government and its institutional lenders was introduced by the 
government to the parliament for approval. The agreement was approved by a large majority since, on 
top of the non-defecting government MPs, all the MPs from the pro-EU parties (New Democracy, 
Potami, PASOK) also supported the deal. Nevertheless, the failure of the government to maintain 
majority support of 151 MPs led to the Prime Minister's resignation on August 20, 2015. During the 
talks that followed among party leaders, it was reaffirmed that the formation of a new government 
was not possible and thus an early election was called. The members and MPs of SYRIZA who 
opposed their party signing a new “memorandum” formed the new party of Popular Unity.  
2. Electoral rule 
In Greek parliamentary elections all citizens of age eighteen and above have the right to vote. The 
ballot is secret and, essentially, voluntary. Strictly speaking, the Constitution stated that voting is 
compulsory and that the exact penalty for someone abstaining will be specified by a common law. The 
latter provision was eliminated following the 2001 constitutional amendment. Ever since it has 
become lex imperfecta and, hence, potential laws that determine punishments have no constitutional 
                                                          
3  In its winter (February 5, 2015) economic forecast the European Commission projected that the Greek 
economy will grow by 2.5% in 2015, and by an additional 3.6% in 2016, compared to an anaemic growth rate of 
only 0.8% in 2014. By contrast, in its autumn forecast (November 5, 2015), following the imposition of capital 
controls in June, the Commission projected that the Greek economy will slide back to recession, shrinking by 
1.4% and 1.3% in 2015 and 2016 respectively, and will only return to growth by mid-2017. 
 
4  The “No” vote gained 61%. 
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grounds to be applied. On the ballot paper each party presented an ordered list of candidates. The 
election took place under a closed-list system. That is, voters could not express preferences over the 
ranking of candidates. This is a particular feature of the electoral rule –which otherwise specifies an 
open-list system– that was applied for the first time: when an election takes place within a year of the 
previous one, party-lists have to be closed. 
The current electoral law (3636/2008) is a modified PR-system with a plurality premium and, hence, it 
is rather disproportional in favour of the plurality winner. A total of 300 seats are allocated to all 
parties that surpass the three percent electoral threshold; 250 seats are distributed among all parties in 
a proportional manner while the remaining 50 seats are awarded to the plurality winner party as a 
bonus. Most MPs are elected from electoral district lists (288) and the rest (12) from nation-wide 
party lists. A small number of electoral districts (7) elect a unique MP. In the remaining districts, seats 
are attributed to the competing parties as proportionally as possible with the following exception: the 
50-seat plurality bonus is not allocated from a separate list, rather it is allocated by reserving some 
seats in multi-member districts for the winning party irrespective of its electoral performance in that 
particular district. This, obviously, creates sometimes strong distortions in representation.5 
The law was introduced by the centre-left PASOK back in 2004 –when it was a dominant party– and  
was amended by New Democracy (it was made more disproportional) in 2008. The two parties agreed 
in such a distortion to the proportionality of the electoral rule as in the past it tended to favour them 
while SYRIZA had opposed that rule back in 2008 (Matakos and Xefteris 2015a). In the aftermath of 
the 2012 elections and the increase in electoral fragmentation (Matakos and Xefteris 2015b) PASOK 
started to campaign for an electoral rule reform and the abolition of the 50-seat bonus. This time, it 
was SYRIZA who opposed such a reform.  
 
3. Main Issues, Contenders and Campaigns 
The early election of September 20, 2015 was triggered by the fact that the governing coalition lost its 
support in parliament –even falling below the necessary threshold (120 MPs) required for a minority 
government– as a result of its decision, in July, to agree to a third bailout programme –and further 
austerity– with Greece’s institutional lenders. Naturally, therefore, the issue that almost exclusively 
dominated the electoral campaign was related to the third bailout programme and its implementation. 
An additional issue made its appearance during the campaign: the refugee crisis and the uncontrolled 
influx of refugees and migrants from the Turkish mainland to many Greek islands. The issue was 
                                                          
5
 
 For example, in the September election, SYRIZA got all four MPs in the electoral district of Chania 
despite having won only about 40% of the vote. 
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highly controversial and was raised by the conservative opposition parties in order to score gains 
against the governing coalition.   
The main contenders for first place (and the 50-seat bonus that the electoral rule provides) were the 
left-wing party of SYRIZA –which moved towards the centre of the political spectrum after the 
withdrawal of the more extreme Leftist Platform in August– and the main opposition party of New 
Democracy –a conservative centre-right party. Other contenders included parties that have also 
contested the January 2015 election such as the far-right party of Golden Dawn, the once-dominant 
centre-left party of PASOK (which joined forces, this time, with other social-democratic parties 
forming the Democratic Coalition), the centrist liberal party Potami, the Communist Party of Greece, 
SYRIZA’s coalition partner Independent Greeks (a populist right-wing party) and the Centrist Union –
a party that failed to clear the 3% threshold in January. Most notably, the only new player in this 
election was Popular Unity –a splinter party that was formed by SYRIZA’s left-wing dissidents who 
opposed the third bailout. The Movement of Democrats and Socialists, led by ex-Prime Minister 
George Papandreou, did not contest this election. Most parties contested the election under the same 
leadership with the exception of the main opposition party of New Democracy and PASOK which 
elected new leaders in July and June respectively.  
Concerning parties’ positions on the main issues during the campaign, with the exception of the 
Communist Party of Greece, Popular Unity and Golden Dawn, which adapted a clear anti-EU and 
anti-austerity platform, all other parties (the governing coalition and the pro-EU opposition) pledged 
to abide by the conditions of the third bailout and implement the stabilization programme if elected. 
As a result, competition during the campaign was centred on valence issues and the question of which 
party was more capable of implementing those agreed policies: the old elites (implying the parties that 
governed Greece sine 1974) or the new governing coalition of SYRIZA and Independent Greeks –
which came in power in January 2015. Consequently, in comparison with the January 2015 election, 
the main cleavage of political competition shifted from the anti/pro-bailout one (only three small 
parties adopted an anti-bailout platform) to the one of who can better implement and renegotiate parts 
of the agreement with the EU institutions. This shift was the most prominent element of this electoral 
campaign. 
An additional notable feature of the election campaign was the explicit pledge by the ruling SYRIZA 
party to enter in a coalition only with its preferred partner the Independent Greeks despite all polls 
suggesting that this was not a likely outcome –in all polls, the party of Independent Greeks was 
consistently failing to clear the 3% entry barrier. On the other hand, the main opposition party of New 
Democracy pledged to seek the support of SYRIZA in forming a grand-coalition even in the event that 
it won the election. The centrist parties of PASOK and Potami signalled their desire to coalesce with 
the winner –be it SYRIZA or New Democracy– on the basis of a programmatic agreement that did not 
risk Greece’s place into the Eurozone. 
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4. Results 
The election, which was held with closed-lists for the first time, produced a result very similar to that 
of January 2015: the incumbent coalition secured again a majority in the parliament (155 seats) and 
was able to hold on to power. The election result (Table 1) was marked by five main elements: the 
clear victory of SYRIZA despite all polls predicting a very tight race, the failure of Popular Unity –
SYRIZA’s splinter party– to enter parliament, the success of the Independent Greeks in securing their 
representation in the new parliament, the record-high level of abstention, and finally, the remarkable 
resilience of the far-right party of Golden Dawn which scored moderate gains across the country –and 
considerable ones in the islands (e.g. Kos, Lesvos, Leros and Samos) affected by the refugee crisis 
(Fig. 1). Remarkably, the vote shares that the two main contenders (SYRIZA and New Democracy) 
received were not very different from those received in January (Table 1). The same is also true for 
almost all other parties with two notable exceptions: the centrist party Potami saw its support decrease 
by two percentage points while the centre-left PASOK saw its support going up by the same amount. 
Yet, in terms of absolute votes cast, all parties –but for PASOK and Centrist Union– saw a decrease in 
their support (Table 1). This was due to the record-high levels of voter abstention. As a result, the 
decline in turnout offset the decline in the absolute amount of votes that each party received and, 
hence, it did not result in a dramatic change in the distribution of seats in the new parliament (Table 
1).  
Moreover, turnout and abstention followed specific regional patterns in this election. As we show in 
Table 2, urban and metropolitan regions (e.g. Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus, Achaia and Heraklion) 
recorded the sharpest decline in voter turnout compared to the January 2015 elections. Moreover, the 
regions with the sharpest differential decrease in turnout tend to be SYRIZA strongholds (Fig. 2). 
There are many potential explanations for this pattern: electoral fatigue due to the high frequency with 
which people were called to the polls, or decreased pivotality in electorally safe districts (see 
Tukiainen and Lyytikainen 2013). Yet, a crucial element behind this pattern seems to be the fact that 
some of SYRIZA's January 2015 voters chose to abstain either due to disappointment by the party's 
capitulation to the creditor's terms or because they were indifferent between the two main contenders 
that converged and adopted very similar political platforms (see Matakos et al. 2015).  
5. Effects 
The outcome of the election was a clear reaffirmation of Prime Minister Tsipras' mandate to continue 
to govern in collaboration with his coalition partner Independent Greeks. In fact, this was the first 
election in the years following the break-out of the economic crisis –and the imposition of austerity 
programmes– that an incumbent government was not defeated in the polls after signing a bailout 
agreement with the EU institutions (the fate of the Papandreou and Samaras cabinets who agreed to 
the first and second bailouts was sealed by such agreements). In a clear sign of continuity, the Prime 
Minister appointed  to almost all key cabinet positions (i.e. Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of 
Finance, Minister of Economy, Minister of Defence, Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc.) the same 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
individuals that occupied them before the resignation of the previous SYRIZA-Independent Greeks 
coalition government. As a result, negotiations for the formation of a coalition between SYRIZA and 
Independent Greeks were concluded within a day. The new coalition government now commands a 
majority of 155 MPs, down from a majority of 162 in the previous parliament. Thus it is not an 
exaggeration to say that in this election, and despite previous experience, retrospective voting did not 
seem to be in operation (see also Dinas et al. 2015). In spite of the imposition of capital controls –
which resulted in a significant decrease in economic activity (European Commission 2015b)– voters 
decided not to punish the two coalition partners: they jointly lost only about two percentage points 
and seven seats. This pattern is strengthened further by the fact that Popular Unity, consisting of ex-
SYRIZA MPs and cabinet ministers who resigned in disagreement to the third bailout, failed to clear 
the 3% barrier and enter parliament.  
 
Moreover, the election result was also a clear reaffirmation of the pro-EU orientation of Greece: the 
combined vote share of all pro-EU parties which supported the third bailout programme in August 
2015 exceeded 80 percent. As a result, the mandate of the government to swiftly implement the 
agreement with the EU institutions was reinforced further. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the 
Prime Minister has set the implementation of the agreement as the top priority of his government 
during the first cabinet meeting. On the negative side, the remarkable resilience of the far-right, 
xenophobic, and anti-EU party of Golden Dawn –which secured its parliamentary representation for a 
fourth time in a row, finishing third as it did in January 2015- casts a shadow on the, otherwise, strong 
support that all pro-EU parties received in this election.  
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Table 1: Results (allocation of votes and seats) of the September 20, 2015 General Parliamentary Election in Greece 
Note: PASOK – Democratic Coalition’s vote shares are compared to the sum of the vote shares that its two constituent parties (PASOK and Democratic Left) received in 
the January 25, 2015 elections. Popular Unity did not contest the January 25, 2015 election as it was part of the SYRIZA party. In the percentage of other parties in 
January 2015 the vote share of former Prime Minister Papandreou’s party is included. Parties’ vote shares are computed on the basis of only the valid votes cast. The 
percentages of blank and null votes are computed on the basis of all votes cast.  
 September 2015 
 
January 2015 
 
Change (Sep – Jan) 
in 
Party 
 
Percent 
 
Votes 
 
Seats 
 
Percent 
 
Votes 
 
Seats 
 
Percent 
 
Seats 
 
SYRIZA 
 
35.46 1,925,904 145 36.34 2,245,978 149 -0.88 -4      
New Democracy 
 
28.10 1,526,205 75 27.81 1,718,694 76 +0.29 -1 
Golden Dawn 
 
6.99 379,581 18 6.28 388,387 17 +0.71 +1 
PASOK – Democratic 
Coalition 
6.28 341,390 17 5.16 319,289 13 +1.12 +4 
Communist Party  
 
5.55 301,632 15 5.47 338,188 15 +0.08 0 
Potami 
 
4.09 222,166 11 6.05 373,924 17 -1.96 -6 
Independent Greeks 
 
3.69 200,423 10 4.75 293,683 13 -1.06 -3 
Centrist Union 
 
3.43 186,475 9 1.79 110,923 0 +1.64 +9 
Popular Unity 
 
2.86 155,242 0 N/A N/A N/A +2.86 0 
Other parties 
 
3.55 192,831 0 6.35 392,485 0 -2.80 0 
Voter turnout 
 
56.57 5,566,295 -.- 63.62 6,330,356 -.- -7.05 -.- 
Valid votes (% of total) 
 
97.58 5,431,850 -.- 97.64 6,180,872 -.- -0.06 -.- 
Blank / Null votes 
 
2.42 134,445 -.- 2.36 149,484 -.- +0.06 -.- 
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Table 2: Districts with the largest drop in voter turnout from January to September 2015 
District name Sep. 2015 Jan. 2015 Difference Winner in 
September 2015 
SYRIZA margin 
(in Jan. 2015) 
Attica 
 
63.86 74.6 -10.74 SYRIZA 11.18 
Piraeus B 
 
56.57 67.23 -10.66 SYRIZA 23.09 
Athens B 
 
63.30 72.82 -9.52 SYRIZA 11.42 
Argolida 
 
56.98 66.48 -9.50 ND -1.47 
Thessaloniki A 
 
59.90 69.25 -9.35 SYRIZA 9.28 
Achaia 
 
59.25 68.54 -9.29 SYRIZA 22.47 
Thessaloniki B 
 
64.91 74.04 -9.13 SYRIZA 2.41 
Heraklio 
 
63.11 72.23 -9.12 SYRIZA 29.31 
Imathia 
 
59.92 68.94 -9.02 SYRIZA 5.07 
Korinthos 
 
57.64 66.65 -9.01 SYRIZA 6.94 
Voiotia 
 
60.31 69.17 -8.86 SYRIZA 18.86 
Chalkidiki 
 
60.47 69.17 -8.70 ND 0.52 
Magnisia 
 
58.90 67.3 -8.40 SYRIZA 15.31 
Evoia 
 
58.73 67.1 -8.37 SYRIZA 16.81 
Pella 
 
57.48 65.74 -8.26 SYRIZA -1.89 
Larissa 
 
61.15 69.34 -8.19 SYRIZA 8.99 
Piraeus A 
 
52.41 60.54 -8.13 SYRIZA 4.80 
Pieria 
 
56.67 64.53 -7.86 ND -4.06 
Zakynthos 
 
49.59 56.98 -7.39 SYRIZA 18.98 
Kerkyra 
 
49.67 56.99 -7.32 SYRIZA 23.02 
Chania 
 
57.35 64.63 -7.28 SYRIZA 23.25 
Ileia 
 
50.90 58.05 -7.15 SYRIZA 10.99 
Lasithi 
 
58.74 65.86 -7.12 SYRIZA 18.65 
National 
Average 
 
56.57 
 
63.62 
 
-7.05 
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Figure 1. The correlation between the change in electoral support for Golden Dawn (from January 
to September 2015) in all Aegean islands (belonging to the prefectures of Lesvos, Chios, Samos 
and Dodecanese) and their proximity to the Turkish coast. 
 
Figure 2. The correlation between the change in voter turnout (from January to September 2015) 
and SYRIZA’s margin of victory in January 2015 election. 
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